This paper introduces Adversarial Resilience Learning (ARL), a concept to model, train, and analyze arti cial neural networks as representations of competitive agents in highly complex systems. In our examples, the agents normally take the roles of attackers or defenders that aim at worsening or improving-or keeping, respectively-de ned performance indicators of the system. Our concept provides adaptive, repeatable, actor-based testing with a chance of detecting previously unknown attack vectors. We provide the constitutive nomenclature of ARL and, based on it, the description of experimental setups and results of a preliminary implementation of ARL in simulated power systems.
INTRODUCTION
Current newspapers are full of horri c tales of "cyber-attackers" threatening our energy systems. And, if not for the notorious "evil state"-actor, it is the ongoing digitization necessary to enable increasing renewable and volatile energy generation that threatens our energy supply and thus the stability of our society. And while the main approach seems to be to patch-up the detected vulnerabilities of protocols, software and controller devices, our approach is to research and develop the means to systematically design and test systems that are structurally resilient against failures and attackers alike.
Security in cyber-systems mostly should be concerned with establishing asymetric control in favour of the operator of a system. In order to achieve this on a structural level at design time, reproducible benchmark tests are required. This is notoriously di cult for intelligent adversaries whose primary ability are adaption and creativity. Thus, testing methods nowadays are either reproducible and insu ciently modelling attacker -or they involve unreproducible human elements. Reinforcement learning may be useful to provide at least some adaptability of reproducible attacker models.
This work takes its motivation and rst practical implementation from the power system domain, but the work can directly be applied to all highly complex, critical systems. Systems that may bene t from Adversarial Resilience Learning (ARL) are too complex to be su ciently described using analytic methods, i. e., because 2018 . XXXX-XXXX/2018/1-ART1 $15.00 DOI: 10.1145/nnnnnnn.nnnnnnn the number of potential states is to large and the behaviour is too complex with too many non-trivial interdependencies.
This work introduces ARL, which provides a method to analyse complex interdependent systems with respect to adversarial actors. The foremost motivation is to provide a method for deterministic analysis method for complex and large systems including some degree of adaptivity of the simulated attackers.
The main contribution of this paper is the introduction of a novel structure for training and application of Arti cial Neural Networks (ANNs) that generalizes the approach of adversarial learning. By setting up ANN-based agents in a competitive situation, the learningcomplexity is comprised not only of a highly complex system, but also of competing ANNs whose changing state, manifested by modied behaviour of the system under consideration, has to be included in the trained model. We assume that this provides a very interesting new problem class for Reinforcement Learning (RL), as it introduces a cyclic learning competition.
The paper is structured as follows. First, a brief introduction into related techniques in machine learning and related work for complex system analysis is given. The paper then de nes the concept of Adversarial Resilience Learning in Section 3, and introduces its application to adversary testing in power system control in Section 4. The paper is completed by a presentation of lessons' learned and results from an early proof-of-concept demonstrator in Section 4.2. Itconcludes with a discussion and an outlook in Section 5
RELATED WORK
This work aims at exploring the feasibility of improving resilience of complex systems using machine learning to train adaptive agents. The term resilience is lacking a coherent and precise de nition across elds. Generally it denotes the ability of a system to withstand unforseen, rare and potentially catastrophic events, recover from the damage and adapt by improving itself in reaction to these events. Ideally, resilience is increasing monotonously throughout system improvement. A useful simpli cation is observation of the changing behaviour of system performance as an artefact resulting from resilience processes. Di erent formalisation of resilience processes exist, but most distinguish subprocesses for planning, absorbtion of damage, recovery (or self-healing) and improvement (or adaption). [2] See Figure 1 for an expression of a hypothetical system's performance su ering twice from damaging events. Resilience is modelled as a sequential process: Plan, Absorb, Recover and Adapt. [30] As consequence of the rst event the performance of the system is pushed below a failure threshold, i. e., the system fails to provide its service. Improvement of the system is then achieved after recovery as the system is able to keep the performance above the failure threshold during the second event. 
Analysis and Stochastic Modelling
The main distinction of our approach as compared to game theoretic modelling and stochastic analysis is the use of co-simulation and heuristic approaches instead of formal abstraction of complete systems. The underlying assumption is, that a system-of-systems is too complex, and malicious adversaries are too unpredictable to be su ciently analysed.
But similarly to Attacker-Defender Models, e. g., described in [4] that at analysing an equilibrium between attackers and defenders in dynamic systems, our work aims at heuristically approach an estimate of the asymmetry of attacker and defender in these systems. The approach of ARL structurally similar to the concept of Stackleberg Competition and related applications of stochastic analysis, e. g., pursuit-evasion in di erential games [26] . These approaches seem to only be applicable to scenarios that can be restricted to few degrees of freedom. More realistic behaviours of opportunistically acting threat agents within complex system-of-systems leads to an explosion of states in analytic approaches.
Recent surveys seem to support this view. Referenced approaches on power systems in [11] provide no details on the used gametheoretic model and use ambiguous terminology of the researched threat scenarios. Approaches in Machine Learning (ML) to tackle complex problems, on the other hand, have, not only recently, been very successful in providing novel, practical solutions.
Machine Learning
ANNs are universal function approximators, meaning that they can be used as a statistical model of any Borel-measurable function R n → R m with desired non-zero error [9, 17, 24] . Already the standard Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) (e. g., Elman [13] ) has the capacity to approximate any non-linear dynamic system [38] , and Siegelmann and Sonntag have shown that RNNs are turingcomplete [39] .
In practice, a typical problem for which RNNs, especially structures containing Long-Short Term Memory (LSTM) cells [23] or Gated Recurrent Units (GRUs) [6, 7] are used, is time series prediction. Even greater memory capacity is achieved by neural turing machines, introduced by Graves et. al. [20] , which also counter the learning problem that is inherent to the turing-completeness of RNNs: in theory, a RNNs have the capacity to simulate arbitrary procedures, given the proper set of parameters; in practice, this training task has proven to be complicated. Neural Turing Machines counter the complexity with a vastly increased addressable memory space and have shown to be able to simulate simple, but complete algorithms like sorting [ibd.].
Predicting a time series with an RNN constitutes the instantiation of a (non-linear) dynamic system [3, 42, 44] , i. e., the prediction is the result of the system's behavior, which is, in turn, modeled and approximated by the RNN. Cessac has examined ANNs from the perspective of dynamical systems theory, characterizing also the collective dynamics of neural network models [5] .
Di erent ways exist to train ANNs and RNNs. When using supervised training methods, the training set consists of both, vectors of input and known output the ANN is expected to exhibit. Two di erent classes of training algorithms are popular for this type of training, with gradient-decent-based algorithms of the Backpropagationof-Error family leading by far [8, 12, 28, 34, 35] , followed by evolutionary algorithms such as CMA-ES [21, 22, 33] or REvol [36, 43] . However, all optimization methods adapt the ANN to minimize a cost function and not directly to create a model of a problem; this happens only indirectly. As a result, ANNs can still be "foiled, " i. e., made to output widely wrong results in the face of only minor modications to the input. This e ect and how to counter it is the subject of adversarial learning research.
With unsupervised learning, the ANN tries to detect patterns in the input data that diverge from the background noise. Unsupervised learning does not use the notion of expected output [16] . A modern application of unsupervised learning has emerged in the concept of Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs). Here, one network, called the generator network, creates solution candidatesi. e.,maps a vector of latent variables to the solution space-, which are then evaluated by a second network, the discriminator [18] . Ideally, the result of the training process are results virtually indistinguishable from the actual solution space, which is the reason GANs are sometimes called "Turing learning." The research focus of ARL is not the generation of realistic solution candidates; this is only a potential extension of the attackers and defenders themselves. ARL, however, describes the general concept of two agents in uencing a common model but with di erent sensors (inputs) and actuators (output) and without knowing of each others presence or actions.
RL [25] describes a third class of learning algorithms. It extends the process of adapting the weight matrix of any ANN by including the notion of an environment into the training process. In RL, an agent interacts with its environment that provides it with feedback, which can be positive or negative. The agent's goal is to maximize its reward. The agent internally approximates a reward function in order to achieve a high reward through actions for every state of its environment. Initially, RL was not tied to ANNs [31] . However, as the environment becomes more complex, so does the agent's reward function; ANNs are very well suited for function approximation or, if the reward is based on a complex state of a world, i. e., a dynamic system, RNNs are suitable. For ARL, we assume a common model that is used by two distinct agents: while one probes the model for weaknesses in order to nd attack vectors, the other monitors the system and, unbeknowing of the presence of the attacker or its actions, works at keeping the system in its nominal state. Through this structure, the notion of ARL assumes that the model-i. e., each agent's environment-is not completely known to the respective agent. Therefore, the usage of RL readily suggests itself.
The abstract notion of a model can see multiple instantiations; one such instantiation of ARL would be using a power grid as the model considered by both agents. Ernst et al. employ RL for stability control in power grids [14] . In their paper, they design a dynamic brake controller to damp large oscillations; however, since the reward function is easily well-de ned, there is no need for using an ANN for function approximation. Figure 2 shows the general schema of RL, adapted from literature for the power grid as the environment.
The concept we propose in this paper is related to Adversarial Learning (AL) insofar, as both concepts use two distinct ANNs with con icting objectives [19] .
AL is the eld of exploiting vulnerabilities in learning algorithms in order to a ect the behaviour of the resulting (learned) system. The prevalent technique is specially crafting inputs that lead to unintended patterns being recognised. A secondary objective is to use inputs that are not recognised as disturbing patterns by humans. AL thus are a concept to implement a Stackelberg Competition in neural networks.
A very recent example is given by Evtimov et al. [15] , where the authors showed how they were able to confuse known deep learning image recognition algorithms by attaching markings to physical objects.
AL neural network setups (for non-physical interventions) are characterised by two output layers in sequence. The rst output layer functions as the adversary, generating outputs from a given input layer, i. e., the "real world inputs" The second output layer represents the function of the original classi er that has to learn to correctly classify the original inputs despite the adversary's e orts to scramble the input.
ADVERSARIAL RESILIENCE LEARNING
ARL is distinguished from AL by the recurrent structure in which adversary and defender are interacting. While GAN directly connect a generating adversary with a detecting defender, ARL adversary and defender interact only through the system they are using for input and output. In this interaction adversaries are identi ed as agents inserting disturbances into the system, while defenders provide resilience control.
De nition 3.1 (Adversarial Resilience Learning (informal)). ARL is an experimental structure comprised of two disjoint groups of agents and a system or simulated system. The agents are distinguished as attacker and defender by adhering to con icting optimisation objectives. Both groups of agents receive their input from a, potentially overlapping, set of measurements from the system. They in uence the system through two disjunct sets of outputs connected to controls in the simulated system.
Fundamental Notation and Model
The basic abstract scenario using ARL consists of two competing agents and a system model. Each of the three elements resembles a state transition. In order to establish a sound formal base, a de nition of notation and processes of ARL is provided here. A summary of notations used is given in table 1.
ARL consists of a set of agents, where each agent has a model, denoted by A, and a model of a system, M. The agent model A serves as a "blue-print" for the actual behavior of a running system; similarly, M denotes a static model of a world. An index identi es a particular agent model, e. g., A A denotes the category of attacker models, A Ω serves to denote the category of defender models. At run-time, the models are instantiated. We denote instances of a model with lower-case letters a, where the index denotes a particular state of the model, such as a t with t commonly referring a point in simulation time. In the same vein, m denotes an instance of a world model.
Each agent tries to maximize its rewards by approximating the agent-speci c performance function,
(1) For an agent, the performance function p a (·) is equal to its reward function in RL terminology. However, the notion of the performance function lets us decouple agent behavior from the desired/intended or undesired performance of the world, denoted by
as the di erence between the world's current performance to its nominal performance, p * .
Agents are categorized through their performance function, an agent model is identi ed as attacker model A A if his reward function p a behaves inverse to the systems performance. The opposite is true for agents from A Ω . That is, we can de ne:
De nition 3.2 (Attacker and Defender Classes). For all times t and model instances m ∈ M, the following provides a classi cation rule for attackers and defenders:
The performance of an agent is tightly coupled to an agent's view of its environment, i. e., the world. Each p a (·) can only be de ned in terms of the agent's sensory inputs, i. e., the part the world it can observe. The portion of the state of a system instance an agent a can observe is denoted by
Given the sensory inputs of an agent a at t are given as x a,t , the agent can act by approximating its reward function p a (·). This approximation is the agent's activation of its internal dynamic system approximator act(·); implemented through, e. g., an RNN, such that
where we assume that an agent is always able to observe its environment through ψ a (m t ), i. e., |x a,t | > 0, whereas it can choose not to act, i. e., | a,t +1 | ≥ 0. An agent then acts on the system model through its actuators' actions, a,t , which are de ned in its respective agent model, where each agent has a speci ed set of actions of an actuator available at any given time. Each agent de nes an action policy for controlling its actuators. In the simple case, the actions of an actuator are mapped from labels [ 1 , 2 , . . . , m ] of, e. g., an internal RNN: Each evaluation step of the performance function maps the sensor inputs x a,t onto likelihood values a,t for all labels of all actuators. The common interpretation is that from each group of labels, the action mapped from the highest-valued label is chosen as the one exerted onto the system by the agent. However generally, an action policy takes on a form that is suitable for the whole action search space, such as a policy network steering a monte carlo tree search as has been shown in [40] . Thus, an agent is acting through the evaluation and application of its system approximator. This happens for each agent 1, 2, . . . , n. In brief, the systems behavior is heavily in uenced by the set of all actuators that can be controlled by the respective agents. Thus, an agent does not simple perceive a model (or a part thereof), but the state of the model as the result of all agents acting upon it. Thus, an agent does not simply create an internal representation of a dynamic system, but of a dynamical system-ofsystems.
Finally, the simulator evaluates the actions of all agents applied to the world model at t, m t . This is represented by the evaluation function,
where the aggregated inputs and outputs over all agents are represented as vectors
Symbol Description m of M An instance of a system model a of A An instance of an agent model
Reference performance of normal operation, of failure threshold p(m t )
Overall performance of a system instance m at time t (eq. (2)) p a (m t )
Performance with respect to the objectives of agent instance a at t given the system instance m (eq.
Inputs to agent a at time t, eq. (4) a,t
Actions of a at t, given observable state x a,t (eq. (5)) a t , x t , t Vectors of all agents' states, observable agent inputs, and agent actions corresponding a (eq. (7)) act Activation of agent a, transforming the observable system instance states x a,t at t into an actions a,t for t + 1, altering agent instance states from a t to a t +1 (eq. (5) If the activation vectors of the participating agents consider a disjoint set of controllers, i. e., the actions application is commutative, the transition of the world state from m t to m t +1 is the result of an aggregation of all agents' actions t . Non-commutative application of actions is out of scope of this work.
Formal Definition
Using the notation introduced here and summarized for reference in table 1, we de ne the concept of ARL as model and connection setup with transition process in the following way.
An setup in ARL is comprised of agents a ∈ A ∪ Ω, which include, at least, one instance of each set A, Ω. Each agent is related to a set of inputs X a and a set of outputs Y a .
Further the setup requires a world model m which provides a set of sensors X m and controls Y m .
The central process of ARL is the dynamic system-of-systems view of a set of agents a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a n acting upon a shared instance of a world model. Activation functions act a of agents and application e al of agent agents to a wordl model form a cyclic sequence of activation and application that transforms the states of model and agents into a sequence of states as shown in g. 3.
An experiment of ARL is the execution of this sequence. The resulting data of an experiment is the sequence of states, inputs and outputs (m t , a t , x t , t ), t ∈ {1, . . . , n} as well as the initial setup m 0 , a 0 .
Thus nally we can strive to formalise the idea by collecting all components in a single scenario: ARL thus is the application of RL, as introduced in Section 2.2, to iteratively improve the internal decision structure that determines the behaviour of an agent act a . The output of ARL then is, depending on the exerimenters objectives, an observation of the performance of the system model M or a set of agents trained towards the de ned objectives.
Optimization Problem Statement
This section describes possible optimization problems that provide the motivation for ARL.
ARL resembles a closed-loop control situation with (at least) two con icting controls. Herein are distinguished two di erent optimisation objectives that provide di erent uses of ARL. The di erent uses, as depicted in g. 4, improve di erent elements to achive either an improved threat tests, or a more resilient system. The primary distinction is between evolving parameters of ANN in order to optimize individual agents or step-wise advancing the structure of the system model. Our concept itself is oblivious to the algorithms used for optimization.
3.3.1 System Optimization. The primary objective is to nd the inherent control asymmetry of a given control system to nally recommend system designs that favor the defender over the attacker. In control theory this could be expressed as a system, where for all possible sequences of actions by the attacker for a given system model M there is at least one corresponding sequence of actions for the defender and the resulting performance of the system will never drop below a given failure threshold. This requirement can be relaxed by de ning a nite measure of failure that may be acceptable, for example during an initiation phase.
Objectives of defender and attacker in control scenarios are focussed on system states measured by a model performance function eq. (2), as formally given in theorem 3.2. In general, we call an agent defender if its objective is to keep the performance at least above the failure threshold. We denote an agent as attacker if it aims at pushing the performance below a expression for a failure threshold, as seen in Figure 1 .
We denote the objective of asymmetry -favouring defence of a system -given a candidate system model instance m and defender agent a Ω that
Which describes that the performance, for all potential attackers a in A, there exists a defender a * Ω , with given initial state m t 0 , will never fall below a de ned failure threshold p f . To account for a learning period we allow for a nite initialisation time until t 0 .
Improvement is achieved by evolutionary changes to the system model M, improved defensive agent models A or training of defensive agents a Ω , as discussed in the following section.
Agent-Training.
Training of threat agents aims at improving attack abilities, including the identi cation of previously unknown attack vectors, in order to provide testing capabilities. Improved threat tests allow to de ne test requirements for system designs that improve systems' resilience against security threats. One objective is to train threat agents that can be used as benchmarks for future system designs.
An agent's objective is implemented through a reward function that is used within a reinforcement learning process that successively improves the agent's behaviour towards that objective.
One particularly surprising success of RLs algorithms has been the identi cation of solutions unthought-of by experts, especially if applied to zero-information initial states. A two-agent, con ictingobjectives game only one potential learning structure usable with ARL. But the concept allows potentially for all combinations of oneor-many zero-information reinforcment agents and static or even human-controlled competition.
APPLICATION TO POWER SYSTEMS
In this section an example application of ARL to adversarial control in power systems is shown as a feasibility demonstration. We show that ARL provides a novel approach to analyze fundamental control asymmetries between intelligent attackers and defenders. The nal aim of this application is to design and analyse system con gurations that are inherently favoring the defender in his objective to stabilize system performance.
Applied on power systems, e. g., the performance function is expressed as diversion from a speci ed range of acceptable state values. The attackers objective is to force the system to a state where one or more values are outside allowed ranges, its success is measured by the amount and duration of the deviation. The "defender" has lost the competition if the attacker is able to divert any of the system's parameters beyond the acceptable range. 
. ENTSO-E Operational Phases
Speci c objectives for attackers can vary widely as there are many di erent parts of a power system that can be a ected in order to disrupt service and reduce system performance. Attackers may aim at demolition of connected machines or components of the transmission and control system. Thus, to strive for a more general speci cation of objectives, we better consider the objectives of defenders and speci y a deviation from these objectives as "win" for the attackers. The objectives for the defender are very well de ned in the power system domain.
Di erent speci c requirements apply for di erent parts of the power system. Common parameters to consider are voltage V in V, 1 frequency f in Hz, phasor angle ϕ in rad, real power P in W, and reactive power in VAr. In general, phase synchronicity is more important for high-voltage transmission grids, as asynchronicity leads to harmonics in the power system, with potentially desastreous large power ows between large segments of the grid. For the european transmission grid the operation guidelines, de ning conditions for four phases: normal, alert, emergency, and blackout, shown in Figure 5 , are de ned in [1] .
Similarly operational parameters exist for medium-and lowvoltage-grids, power generation and connected loads. DIN EN 50160 speci es parameters for the operation of distribution grids. It de nes that voltage has to stay between 0.9 pu and 1.1 pu. It is acceptable, by de nition in EN 50160, that voltage drops down to at least 0.85 pu for at most 5% of a week. Frequency must only deviate from the nominal 50 Hz by at most 4% above or 6% for not more than 0.5% of the year, i. e., less than 2 days overall. Normal operation must deviate no more than ±1%. [10] An attack, in this simulation is deemed successful if any requirement exceeds its de ned limits. Figure 6 shows the re nement of the generic ARL-structure as described in section 3 for the power grid scenario using ANN to implement a single adversary and a single defender. Both agents interact only through sensors and actuators that in uence di erent controls in the power grid.
In the remainder of this section we introduce a Proof-of-Concept (PoC) implementation of ARL using PandaPower [41] for static 1 Voltage is often given in power unit, pu, which takes the value 1 for normal voltage. E. g., if 110 kV is the nominal voltage in a distribution grid, 1 pu is 110 kV, and 0.9 pu = 0.9 · 110 kV = 99 kV. grid simulation and the Keras-RL library [32] for implementation of reinforcement learning for ANNs. First, a brief description of the control scenario is provided, followed by a discussion of the preliminary results.
Static Control Scenario
The objective of this proof-of-concept is to show the general feasibility of using (multiple) ANN-heuristics and train them by reinforcement learning to modify controls in a static power system simulation towards their objectives.
The simulation uses a simple medium voltage power grid, as model from the static grid simulation pandapower [41] . The grid contains four generators connected by six transformers to six loads. For the PoC, we chose to only use voltage as state-indicator and input to the reward of the attacker. The initial con guration of the grid comprises a stable healthy state of the grid that would be held up constantly if no control actions would be initiated.
Actuators in this scenario are tap changer, reactive power control, loads and generation levels as represented by the commonly deployed and future automated controls in power systems.
The reward function for the attacker is shown at the bottom right in Figure 9a . Initial trials pointed towards the inverse of a Poisson Density Function centered on the nominal voltage unit. The reward function thus resembles the objective for an attacker, providing only positive rewards if the mean voltage deviates more than 5% from the nominal voltage. The single agent in this demonstration had been assigned direct control of every transformer, generator and load in this scenario.
In terms of optimization from Section 3.3, the scenario instantiates m from M = Simple Example, with a single agent a ∈ A A , with a parametrized normal distribution
where c, µ and σ parametrize the reward curve, −1 [a A A ] negates the reward if a is an attacker 2 , and x = mean x a,t is the average of all inputs. 
Demonstrator
In order to show the genearal feasibility of the concept, we implemented a demonstrator for reinforcement learning in power control scenarios. The current implementation uses static simulation in PandaPower [41] . It supports free con gurability of controlled sensors and actuators of multiple agents, selection of ANN-algorithms and -parameters, as well as di erent logging and output formats. Each experiment is speci ed within a single con guration le, in order to support documentation and reproducibility of experiments. A experimental con guration ( Figure 7 ) de nes three major simulation components: a grid model, one or more agents, and a collection of result logs that collect results. At the time of writing, the whole demonstrator is refactored to use the mosaik co-simulation framework. [29, 37] The interconnection between agents and grid simulation, i. e., the inputs (sensors) and outputs (actuators), x a and a respectively, are separately de ned for each agent.
The execution of the simulation is round based. The rounds are advanced in steps according to a de ned evaluation order of agents. Agents are sequentially executed, a de ned number of steps each. The grid state is evaluated between each consecutive pair of agent evaluation steps. After each step, the internal weights of an agent are modi ed by the learning algorithm selected in the con guration of an agent.
Current result monitors output the grid states at every node of the grid into a grid-state-log. For the agents, a log consisting of inputs, outputs and evaluated reward for the output is output to a con gurable le in CSV format. The results are graphically evaluated as is discussed in Section 4.3 below.
Results
To show the usability of our demonstrator we pitched two very simplistic agents with inverse reward functions (Figure 9a and Figure 9d ) against each other, using the example grid shown in Figure 8a as an arena. Both agents were assigned all voltage sensors as input and we divided the actuators among their outputs. The attacker was assigned control of all tab changers, representing a scenario where a vulnerability in one type of controller was exploited. The defender would be granted access to all generators and loads in this scenario. Figure 8 shows a late state of the simulation. Seemingly the attacker gained the upper hand and has been able to increase voltage levels beyond 1.05 pu. The grid representation in Figure 8a shows that especially two central measure points (numbered 4 and 3) are struck with very high voltage levels, represented by the length of the bars rooted at the nodes, most likely su cent for the connected loads to shut down or be damaged. The mean voltage level of the system, depicted for steps 1900 until 2000, in Figure 8b shows that even the lower voltages of other nodes, e. g., 11 and 9 are not su cient to lower the mean voltage to acceptable levels. Thus, in this example the attacker has been able to destabilize the grid, despite the e orts of the attacker.
Evaluating the two agents in Figure 9 provides no immediately conclussive cause for the loss of the defender. The cumulative number of positive rewards in Figure 9b for the attacker and Figure 9e , show only small di erences. These asymmetries might be explained by the order of execution, where the defender always acts in response to the attacker. The current reward for the depicted step in the simulation, depicted in Figure 9a and Figure 9d , shows that the defender is evaluating a di erent mean voltage than the attacker. Each reward is calculated after the actions of an agent, thus this graphs show the results of two actions that both improved the performance towards their own objectives.
In this simulation run, that contained a small random input to the learning algorithm, the positive learning curve for both agents, in Figure 9b and Figure 9e , is increasing right from the start of the simulation. In preliminary tests with a lone attacker, the learning process rst went through a lengthy phase where only little positive rewards where achieved. Although we have no conclussive answer for the reasons of this diverging learning behaviour, it shows at least, that the interactions between adversaries have an e ect on their behaviour.
DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
This work introduced Adversarial Resilience Learning (ARL), a novel approach to analyse competetive situations in highly-complex systems using reinforcement learning with arti cial neural networks as reproducable, self-improving agents. The concept can be seen as an extension of Generative Adversarial Network (GAN), which distinguishes itself by including interaction to a complex system (simulation) in between the competing agents. This work is motivated by the need to nd better methods to automatically evaluate system behaviour under threat of maliciously acting, intelligent threat agents. The main idea is, that groups of agents, modelled by Arti cial Neural Network (ANN), struggle to enforce their objectives against agents with con icting objectives. Pitching two-or more-ANNs with con icting reward functions against each other may allow to de ne more realistic tests for adversarial or competitive situations. Using reinforcement learning harbours the promise of nding novel strategies for both attack and defense, which both can be used to strengthen the resilience of systems during the design and testing phase of a power system or individual components. ARL-based analysis should contribute to building grid structures that are more resilient to attacks and train both arti cial and human operators in better handling of security incidents.
Generally, the concept may allow to estimate threat-related indices, for example the maximum amount of control that an adversary may be allowed to gain over a system, which leads to improved and more e ective recommendations for security directives and risk mitigations.
Furthermore, we believe that ARL provides a valuable addition to the increased complexity for adversarial learning. Agents in ARL have not only to approximate the behaviour of a highly-complex systsem, but also have to learn and adopt to changing behaviour of this system due to the actions in icted by the competing agents. In this way, not only the amount of control over a system provides a source of asymmetry, but also power of the ANN.
The concept of ARL and its ongoing implementation in the ARLDemonstrator only marks the starting point for in-depth research on structural asymmetries of complex systems and protection against learning threat agents. The demonstrator provides the abilities to further research in a number of interesting directions.
Foremost is the analysis of structural resilience of complex systems, especially nding minimum control sets of critical components that provide the most defensive capabilities, or estimates of the structural strength of a system. The integration into our cosimulation framework mosaik opens up the possibility of extending the single system into a whole composition into an interdependent system-of-systems. Introduction of multiple domains would, to give one example, allow to analyse the e ects of Information and Communication Technology (ICT)-components onto the performance of power systems.
Deeper extensions of the demonstrator itself will involve capabilities of the defender to a ect structural changes to the system. This would allow to use Reinforcement Learning (RL) to identify novel and more resilient structures. The dual ability for threat agents would be the extension of control, i. e., simulation of further compromise from within a system. Both activities require the introduction of a measure of cost to the demonstrator.
This demonstrator further allows to analyse simulated systems from the point of view of threat agents, by pitching the agent against novel security measures, for example simulation of distributed coordinated attacks. Combining this view with multi-domain scenarios, would enable analysis of sophisticated, multi-level attack techniques that involve, for example information hiding or emission of misleading information by attacker or defender. That means nding novel ways of attack using a combination of illeagal and legal operations and interdependencies between di erent systems. Consequentially all these approaches would lead to the development of improved designs and testing methods for highly complex systems.
We can only assume that this nally lead to more resilient designs and defensive adaptable strategies -and, in the end, to improvements for the security of supply, but at this stage of the work, the rst results are very satisfying.
